Injustice Under Law: Perpetuating And Criminalizing Poverty Through The Courts by Foster, Judge Lisa
Georgia State University Law Review
Volume 33
Issue 3 Spring 2017 Article 8
5-24-2017
Injustice Under Law: Perpetuating And
Criminalizing Poverty Through The Courts
Judge Lisa Foster
Follow this and additional works at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, Courts
Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Criminal Procedure Commons, Judges Commons, Law and
Economics Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Law and Society Commons, and the Social
Welfare Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at Reading Room. It has been accepted for inclusion in Georgia State
University Law Review by an authorized editor of Reading Room. For more information, please contact mbutler@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Judge Lisa Foster, Injustice Under Law: Perpetuating And Criminalizing Poverty Through The Courts, 33 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 695 (2017).
Available at: https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol33/iss3/8
  
695
INJUSTICE UNDER LAW: PERPETUATING AND 
CRIMINALIZING POVERTY THROUGH THE 
COURTS 
Judge Lisa Foster (Ret.)* 
 
In 1962, in a speech to the American Bar Association, former 
Attorney General Robert Kennedy asked, “do . . . minorities or 
people who speak our language imperfectly . . . or those who are poor 
really receive the same protection before the courts as the rest of our 
citizens? [A]ll too often,” he said, “they do not.”1 Today, our justice 
system is no longer formally based on race, ethnicity, or national 
origin, but it does depend on wealth. 
Money matters in the justice system. If you can afford to purchase 
your freedom pretrial, if you can afford to immediately pay fines and 
fees for minor traffic offenses and municipal code violations, if you 
can afford to hire an attorney, your experience of the justice system 
both procedurally and substantively will be qualitatively different 
than the experience of someone who is poor. More disturbingly, 
through a variety of policies and practices—some of them blatantly 
unconstitutional—our courts are perpetuating and criminalizing 
poverty. And when we talk about poverty in the United States, we are 
still talking about race, ethnicity, and national origin. The majority of 
poor people in the United States are people of color.2 Although a 
substantial plurality are white, 24% of African-Americans and 21% 
of Hispanics live in poverty.3 Yet, African-Americans comprise just 
12% of the total population, and Hispanics comprise just 18%.4 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
*The author is the former Director of the Office for Access to Justice at the U.S. Department of Justice 
and a former California Superior Court Judge. This essay would not have been possible without the 
thoughtful work of my former colleagues at the Office for Access to Justice. 
 1. Att’y Gen. Robert F. Kennedy, Speech to the American Bar Association House of Delegates 4 
(Aug. 6, 1962). 
 2. Poverty Rate by Race/Ethnicity, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/other/state-
indicator/poverty-rate-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0 (change Data View to “number”) (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 3. Id. (change Data View to “percent”). 
 4. Population Distribution by Race/Ethnicity, HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., http://kff.org/ 
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impact of what we have done and continue to do daily in courtrooms 
throughout the United States is to trap people—including 
disproportionately people of color—in poverty.5 
In this essay, I will describe how the justice system enforces 
poverty employing three examples: bail, fines and fees, and access to 
counsel in civil cases. These are by no means the only ways in which 
the justice system quite literally imprisons people in poverty, but they 
are widespread and particularly pernicious. I will also provide a legal 
framework for analyzing these practices and a brief gloss on their 
history. I will conclude hopefully with a discussion of successful 
reform efforts and a way forward. 
A. Bail 
For ten years, I was a judge in California, and though I had been a 
civil litigator for my entire legal career, soon after I became a judge, I 
found myself presiding in a criminal trial department. I did not know 
very much about bail; I did not have to. San Diego County, like all 
California counties, is required by law to adopt a bail schedule,6 and 
it is easy to use. Each offense is paired with a dollar amount.7 If you 
are arrested, for example, for possession of a controlled substance, 
your bail is $1,000; if you are arrested for assault with a firearm, bail 
is $20,000.8 If you or your family can afford to pay a bail bond 
company 10–35% of the bond amount, you are released and given a 
date to come back to court.9 If you cannot afford a bail bond, you 
                                                                                                                 
other/state-indicator/distribution-by-raceethnicity/?currentTimeframe=0 (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 5. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE 
OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010). In The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander persuasively argues that, with 
respect to the war on drugs, this was and is deliberate. See id. However, this article does not address the 
motive for the criminalization of poverty. 
 6. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1269b(d) (West 2017). 
 7. See generally SUPER. CT. OF CAL., CITY OF SAN DIEGO, BAIL SCHEDULE (2016), 
http://www.sdcourt.ca.gov/pls/portal/docs/PAGE/SDCOURT/CRIMINAL2/CRIMINALRESOURCES/
BAIL_SCHEDULE.PDF. 
 8. Id. at 19, 22. 
 9. ARPIT GUPTA, DOUGLAS SWANSON & ETHAN FRENCHMAN, MD. OFFICE OF THE PUB. DEF., THE 
HIGH COST OF BAIL: HOW MARYLAND’S RELIANCE ON MONEY BAIL JAILS THE POOR AND COSTS THE 
COMMUNITY MILLIONS 8 (2016). The money paid to the bail bond company is never refunded. In 
Maryland, a study found that people arrested in the state from 2011–2015 paid combined bail bond 
premiums of more than $256 million. Id. at 4. Of that amount, more than $75 million in nonrefundable 
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stay in jail. It is as simple as that. To be perfectly honest, I did not 
think much about bail, and to the best of my recollection, neither did 
anyone else—not my colleagues on the bench, not the prosecutors, 
nor the public defenders. 
My experience was and is common among state and local judges, 
even though in the federal system, bail works very differently—and 
has for fifty years. In 1964, Attorney General Kennedy testified 
before the Senate Judiciary Committee and urged Congress to enact 
bail reform.10 Attorney General Kennedy explained: 
Every year in this country, thousands of persons are kept in 
jail for weeks and even months following arrest. They are 
not yet proven guilty. They may be no more likely to flee 
than you or I. But nonetheless, most of them must stay in 
jail because, to be blunt, they cannot afford to pay for their 
freedom.11 
As Kennedy and others who testified at the Senate hearings noted, 
bail was not supposed to be a mechanism for keeping people in 
custody.12 In the Middle Ages, when bail first was invented in 
England, defendants were detained indefinitely—often for years—
without trial.13 Bail was devised as a way to allow someone charged 
with an offense to be free; appearance at trial could be secured by a 
pledge to pay money if the defendant did not return to court.14 It 
became readily apparent that bail could be abused.15 In 1689, the 
English Bill of Rights outlawed the widespread practice of keeping 
                                                                                                                 
premiums were collected in cases that were dropped or the defendant was found not guilty. Id. 
 10. See Hearings on S. 2838, S. 2839 & S. 2840 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights and 
Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 88th Cong. 1 
(1964) (testimony of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the U.S.), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/ag/legacy/2011/01/20/08-04-1964.pdf. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. TIMOTHY R. SCHNACKE, MICHAEL R. JONES & CLAIRE M. B. BROOKER, PRETRIAL JUSTICE 
INST., THE HISTORY OF BAIL AND PRETRIAL RELEASE 4 (2010), http://www.pretrial.org/download/pji-
reports/PJI-History%20of%20Bail%20Revised.pdf. 
 14. Id. at 6. 
 15. Id. 
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defendants in jail by setting deliberately unaffordable bail, declaring 
that ‘‘excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed.”16 The language may sound familiar—it is repeated almost 
verbatim in the Eighth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.17 
In 1966, the federal Bail Reform Act adopted that constitutionally 
mandated approach to bail by insisting that judges “may not impose a 
financial condition that results in the pretrial detention of the 
person.”18 The Act requires judges to make an individualized 
assessment of two factors: whether the defendant is a flight risk and 
whether the defendant is a risk to public safety.19 If the judge finds 
that a defendant is a risk to public safety, the judge can impose 
conditions on the defendant’s release or, in rare instances, when no 
conditions can protect the public, detain a defendant pretrial.20 If the 
judge finds the defendant is a flight risk, the judge can set a financial 
condition for his or her release, but only after giving meaningful 
consideration to an individual’s ability to pay and alternative 
methods of securing the defendant’s appearance at trial.21 When 
President Johnson signed the bill into law, he described the bail 
system as “archaic and cruel.”22 “Because of the bail system,” he 
said, “the scales of justice have been weighted not with fact nor law 
nor mercy. They have been weighted with money. But now we can 
begin to insure the defendants are considered as individuals and not 
as dollar signs.”23 
Unfortunately, the Bail Reform Act was not the beginning of a 
movement to reform bail nationwide. It was, practically speaking, the 
end. Until recently, not a single state adopted statutes comparable to 
                                                                                                                 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. 
 18. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(c)(2) (2016). 
 19. Id. § 3142(d). 
 20. Id. § 3142(c). 
 21. See generally id. § 3142(b)–(d) (outlining factors the courts must consider in determining 
whether to hold a defendant in custody until trial or release them on their own recognizance or pursuant 
to conditions). 
 22. Robert Young, Bail Reform Act Is Signed by President, CHI. TRIB., June 23, 1966, at A2. 
 23. Id. 
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the Bail Reform Act.24 To the contrary, the number of people 
incarcerated pretrial has increased dramatically since the 1980s.25 
Despite the United States Supreme Court’s unequivocal declaration 
that “[i]n our society, liberty is the norm, and detention prior to 
trial . . . the carefully limited exception,”26 roughly 60% of the jail 
population nationally is comprised of pretrial defendants—a rate that 
has remained constant over the last decade.27 Since 2000, 95% of the 
growth in the overall jail inmate population has been due to the 
increase in the population of defendants held pretrial.28 Most of those 
detained pretrial are accused of nonviolent offenses.29 
Disproportionately, they are people of color.30 African-Americans 
and Hispanics are at least twice as likely as whites to be detained 
pretrial for non-violent drug arrests.31 
The overwhelming majority are poor.32 Bail perpetuates and 
exacerbates poverty because of course only people who cannot afford 
bail are held in custody pretrial, and pretrial detention often makes 
them poorer.33 As little as three days in custody increases the 
likelihood that a person will lose their job, their housing, be forced to 
abandon their education, and be unable to make their child support 
                                                                                                                 
 24. See Stephen L. Carter, Bail Reform Is Overdue, but Finally Here, BLOOMBERGVIEW (Feb. 16, 
2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-02-16/bail-reform-is-overdue-but-
finally-here; see also Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice, Address at the Texas Fair 
Defense Act 14th Anniversary Symposium Celebration (May 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/ 
speech/director-lisa-foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-2016-national-meeting. 
 25. See RAM SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, INCARCERATION’S FRONT DOOR: THE 
MISUSE OF JAIL IN AMERICA 1, 7, 29 (2015), http://archive.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/ 
downloads/incarcerations-front-door-report_02.pdf. 
 26. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987). 
 27. TODD D. MINTON & ZHEN ZENG, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JAIL 
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2014, at 4 (2015), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/jim14.pdf; see also 
TODD D. MINTON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
JAIL INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2013—STATISTICAL TABLES 1 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
jim13st.pdf. 
 28. MINTON & ZENG, supra note 27, at 1. 
 29. See Richard Williams, Bail or Jail: May 2012, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/bail-or-jail.aspx (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 30. See SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 15. 
 31. See id. at 11. 
 32. BERNADETTE RABUY & DANIEL KOPF, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, DETAINING THE POOR 2 
(2016), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/DetainingThePoor.pdf. 
 33. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5, 12–13, 15–17. 
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payments.34 The consequences of pretrial detention are not only 
borne by the individual in jail, but also by their family and the 
community.35 A child whose single parent is taken into custody not 
only loses the financial and emotional support that parent provides, 
but she may be placed in foster care or be forced to move in with a 
relative and need to change schools.36 The cost of our bail system is 
enormous: $14 billion in direct costs to American taxpayers to detain 
people who are mostly low risk and accused of nonviolent offenses.37 
We also know, and we have known for 50 years, that a decision to 
detain or release a defendant pretrial affects the outcome of a case.38 
An investigation made by the Laura and John Arnold Foundation 
found the following outcomes: 
Compared to defendants released at some point pending 
trial, defendants detained for the entire pretrial period are 
more likely to be sentenced to jail or prison—and for 
longer periods of time. Detained defendants are over four 
times more likely to be sentenced to jail and over three 
times more likely to be sentenced to prison than defendants 
who are released at some point pending trial. Sentences for 
detained defendants are also significantly longer: jail 
sentences are nearly three times as long, and prison 
sentences are more than twice as long.39 
                                                                                                                 
 34. See generally id.; see also 3 Days Count: Commonsense Pretrial, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., 
http://www.pretrial.org/download/advocacy/3DaysCount_overview.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2017). 
 35. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 5. 
 36. Id. at 18. 
 37. PRETRIAL JUST. INST., PRETRIAL JUSTICE: HOW MUCH DOES IT COST? 1, 2 (2017), 
https://university.pretrial.org/viewdocument/pretrial-justice-how-much-does-it. 
 38. In the words of Professor Caleb Foote, “there is an extraordinary correlation between pretrial 
status . . . and the severity of the sentence after conviction.” Caleb Foote, The Coming Constitutional 
Crisis in Bail: I, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 960 (1965). 
 39. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND, & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & 
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., INVESTIGATING THE IMPACT OF PRETRIAL DETENTION ON SENTENCING 
OUTCOMES 3 (2014), https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/Investigating-the-Impact-
of-Pretrial-Detention-on-Sentencing-Outcomes.pdf. 
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People detained pretrial are more likely to plead guilty, not always 
because they are all guilty, but because sometimes it is just the fastest 
way home.40 
Perversely, jail is also a gateway to deeper and more lasting 
involvement in the criminal justice system, turning the public safety 
argument for bail on its head. Defendants detained more than twenty-
four hours pretrial are more likely to commit new crimes after they 
are released.41 
Incarcerating defendants pretrial simply because they are poor 
violates the United States Constitution. In 2015, the Department of 
Justice filed a brief in Varden v. the City of Clanton, advising the 
district court that: “Fundamental and long-standing principles of 
equal protection squarely prohibit bail schemes based solely on the 
ability to pay.”42 Last year, the Department filed an amicus brief in 
the Eleventh Circuit in Walker v. City of Calhoun, arguing that “a 
bail practice violates the fourteenth amendment if, without 
consideration of ability to pay and alternative methods of assuring 
appearance at trial, it results in the pretrial detention of indigent 
defendants.”43 
We have created a bail system in the United States that not only 
punishes people for their poverty, but also makes people accused of 
crimes, their families, and their communities poorer. And, it is being 
done by judges—like me—in violation of the United States 
Constitution. 
                                                                                                                 
 40. Paul Heaton, Sandra Mayson & Megan Stevenson, The Downstream Consequences of 
Misdemeanor Pretrial Detention, 69 STAN. L. REV. 711, 713, 717 (2017). 
 41. CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE VANNOSTRAND, & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, LAURA & 
JOHN ARNOLD FOUND., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION 3 (2014), 
http://www.arnoldfoundation.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/02/LJAF_Report_hidden-costs_FNL.pdf. 
 42. Statement of Interest of the United States at 14, Jones v. City of Clanton, 2015 WL 5387219 
(M.D. Ala. Sept. 14, 2015) (No. 215CV34-MHT), https://www.justice.gov/file/340461/download. 
 43. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 13, Walker v. City 
of Calhoun, 2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 4183 (11th Cir. Mar. 9, 2017) (No. 16-10521-HH), 
https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/887436/download. 
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B. Fines and Fees 
Just as the number of defendants detained pretrial has increased 
dramatically since the mid-1980s, so has the amount of fines and fees 
imposed by the justice system.44 The two are not unrelated, and both 
are a cause and consequence of mass incarceration. Since 1980, the 
number of people incarcerated in the United States has quintupled.45 
All of those individuals were at some point simply accused of a 
crime. In systems with bail schedules or those where judges did not 
consider an individual defendant’s ability to make bail, the result was 
a dramatic increase in pretrial detention.46 Simultaneously, because 
the vast majority of those incarcerated in the U.S. are held in state 
and local jails and prisons, the cost of incarceration has been borne 
overwhelmingly by state and local governments.47 From 1979 to 
2013, total state and local corrections expenditures increased by 
324%—from $17 billion to $71 billion.48 By comparison, during that 
same period, state and local education spending—from pre-
Kindergarten through high school—increased only 107%.49 The cost 
of corrections does not include the cost of adjudication or associated 
costs like public defenders, prosecutors, or police.50 In order to 
defray these costs as well as, in some cases, simply to provide 
                                                                                                                 
 44. Fines are a monetary sanction imposed for violation of a statute. Fine, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). There can be fines for everything from civil infractions like failing to 
walk your dog on a leash to felonies like armed robbery. Id. The most common are traffic fines and fees. 
If you run a red light, the fine might be $100. But in virtually every local or state jurisdiction in the 
country, fees are imposed in addition to the fine. The additional fees can range from five to five hundred 
dollars, and they are assessed for everything from court security to emergency medical services to public 
defenders; in some jurisdictions, the fees go directly into the general fund. See, e.g., Ann McAdams, 
Court Costs: Where Your Fine from Speeding Tickets Really Goes, WECT, http://www.wect.com/story/ 
22237540/court-costs-where-your-speeding-ticket-fine-really-goes (last visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 45. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 1 (2015), 
http://sentencingproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/Trends-in-US-Corrections.pdf. 
 46. SUBRAMANIAN ET AL., supra note 25, at 32–34. 
 47. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., POLICY AND PROGRAM STUDIES SERV., STATE AND LOCAL 
EXPENDITURES ON CORRECTIONS AND EDUC. 1 (2016), https://www2.ed.gov/rschstat/eval/other/ 
expenditures-corrections-education/brief.pdf. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 30. 
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additional general fund revenue, courts have imposed costs and fees 
on defendants.51 
Since 2010, every state except Alaska, North Dakota, and the 
District of Columbia has increased civil and criminal fines and fees.52 
As state and local governments have moved aggressively to collect 
on so-called court debt, we have seen another way in which the 
justice system penalizes poor people: the return of debtor’s prisons—
a blatantly unconstitutional practice.53 Other egregious court 
collection practices, such as driver’s license suspensions, also 
criminalize poverty.54 
Many Americans first heard or read about fines and fees as a result 
of the Justice Department’s investigation of the Ferguson, Missouri 
police department. In 2015, Ferguson City anticipated that 23% of 
the City of Ferguson’s revenue would come from court fines and 
fees.55 The city imposed steep fines and fees for a range of minor 
offenses, including $302 for jaywalking, $427 for disturbing the 
peace, and $531 for allowing high grass or weeds to grow on your 
lawn.56 When people could not afford to pay these fines and fees, 
                                                                                                                 
 51. Even when fees are imposed for financing the justice system, they often hurt poor people the 
most. In at least forty-three states, even if a defendant qualifies for a public defender because of 
indigency, that person can be billed for the cost of the appointed defender. Joseph Shapiro, As Court 
Fees Rise, the Poor Are Paying the Price, NPR (May 19, 2014, 4:02 PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2014/05/19/312158516/increasing-court-fees-punish-the-poor. Many jurisdictions 
charge defendants to apply for a defender before an attorney is appointed; some charge during or after a 
case has concluded for the cost of representation. In Florida and Ohio, individuals are required to pay 
defender fees even if they are acquitted or have charges dropped. Marian Wang, Low-Income Criminal 
Defendants Face Mounting Fees, Even for Public Defenders, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 6, 2010, 10:49 AM), 
https://www.propublica.org/blog/item/criminal-defendants-often-face-mounting-fees-even-for-public-
defenders. 
 52. Russell Simmons, How We Fund Our Criminal Justice System, HUFFINGTON POST: THE BLOG 
(July 12, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/russell-simmons/how-we-fund-our-
criminal_b_10949090.html. 
 53. Cf. Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672–73 (1983). 
 54. See Letter from Vanita Gupta, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Civil Rights Div., Dep’t of 
Justice, and Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice, to Colleagues 6 (Mar. 14, 2016) 
[hereinafter Gupta and Foster Letter], https://www.justice.gov/crt/file/832461/download. 
 55. Michael Martinez, Alexandra Meeks & Ed Lavandera, Policing for Profit: How Ferguson’s 
Fines Violated Rights of African-Americans, CNN (Mar. 6, 2015, 10:55 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/06/us/ferguson-missouri-racism-tickets-fines/. 
 56. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEP’T 52 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf. 
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they were arrested, jailed, and faced payments that far exceeded the 
cost of the original ticket.57 To cite just one example, an African-
American woman had a case stemming from 2007, when, on a single 
occasion, she parked her car illegally.58 She received two citations 
and was assessed $151 in fines and fees and put on a payment plan.59 
The woman, who experienced financial difficulties and periods of 
homelessness over several years, could not always make her 
payments.60 From 2007 to 2014, she was arrested twice, spent six 
days in jail, and paid $550 to the court for the events stemming from 
this single instance of illegal parking.61 Court records show that she 
twice attempted to make partial payments of $25 and $50, but the 
court returned those payments, refusing to accept anything less than 
payment in full.62 As of December 2014, over seven years later, 
despite initially owing $151 and having already paid $550, she still 
owed the City of Ferguson $541.63 
Ferguson is not alone. Lorenzo Brown, a 58-year old disabled 
resident of Montgomery, Alabama, whose only income is a Social 
Security disability check, was arrested at his boarding house by 
police in 2014 for failure to pay court fines and fees arising from 
traffic tickets issued in 2010.64 Mr. Brown was kept in jail for 3 days 
before he was brought to court where a municipal court judge told 
him he could be released if he paid $1400—half of the total amount 
he owed and twice the amount of his monthly disability check.65 
Without conducting any inquiry into his ability to pay, the judge 
ordered him to serve 44 days in city jail to sit out debt at the rate of 
$50 per day.66 In Michigan, an unemployed 19-year old man was 
arrested and incarcerated after failing to pay a $155 fine for catching 
                                                                                                                 
 57. Id. at 4. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 56, at 4. 
 63. Id. 
 64. First Amended Class Action Complaint at 6, Mitchell v. City of Montgomery, 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 195207 (M.D. Ala. Nov. 17, 2014) (No. 2: 14-cv-186-MEF). 
 65. Id. at 7. 
 66. Id. at 1. 
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a fish out of season.67 He was able to pay $175 to a bail bond 
company to get out of jail, but then could not pay the original fine, so 
he went back to jail.68 Vera Cheeks, of Bainbridge, Georgia, was 
cited for rolling through a stop sign in 2013.69 The municipal court 
judge assessed a $135 fine.70 Ms. Cheeks did not have $135, and the 
only way to pay the fine over time was to be put on probation, under 
the supervision of a private company that charged her an additional 
$132 for three months of supervision.71 In court that day, her 
probation officer told her she would have to report to him in person 
every week and make the payments due or a warrant would be issued 
and she would be arrested.72 He demanded $50 immediately.73 Her 
fiancé pawned her engagement ring and a Weed Eater so she could 
leave the building.74 
The breadth and depth of the problem is difficult to overestimate. 
In the United States today, approximately 6,500 municipal courts 
operate in 34 states, although they often go by different names such 
as city courts, justice courts, or mayor’s courts.75 Some states have 
just a handful; others, like Texas and New York, have over one 
thousand.76 Many of the municipal courts are part time, and in 28 
states, one does not have to be a lawyer to be a judge.77 Until 2012, in 
Arkansas, the mayor, by law, was the judge.78 
                                                                                                                 
 67. Ed Spillane, Why I Refuse to Send People to Jail for Failure to Pay Fines, WASH. POST (Apr. 8, 
2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2016/04/08/why-i-refuse-to-send-people-
to-jail-for-failure-to-pay-fines/?utm_term=.2b97c3c55144. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Carrie Teegardin, Ticket Torment: Georgia Probation Systems Ensnare Those Too Poor to Pay 
Traffic Fines, ATL. J.-CONST. (Nov. 22, 2014, 12:00 AM), http://www.myajc.com/news/crime—
law/ticket-torment/X8g1muJFCrl0TufIJRwBkM/. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, RESOURCE GUIDE: REFORMING THE 
ASSESSMENT AND ENFORCEMENT OF FINES AND FEES 2 (2016), https://ojp.gov/docs/ 
finesfeesresguide.pdf. 
 76. Lisa Foster, Director, Office for Access to Justice, Address at the American Bar Association’s 
Annual Summit on Public Defense (Feb. 6, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/director-lisa-
foster-office-access-justice-delivers-remarks-aba-s-11th-annual-summit. 
 77. See Methods of Judicial Selection, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, 
http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/methods/limited_jurisdiction_courts.cfm?state (last 
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The problem of fines and fees is not confined to municipal courts. 
State and local governments have increased fines and fees on all 
criminal defendants, including juveniles.79 Many jurisdictions today 
are enforcing court debt against children or their parents or 
guardians.80 In Sacramento County, California, for example, juvenile 
fees average $4,895.81 In Alameda County, until a recent moratorium 
was imposed, the average court debt imposed in a juvenile 
delinquency case was $2,861, but the average for black children was 
$3,438, while the average for white children was $1,192.82 
Without question, courts have the authority to punish people who 
willfully refuse to pay a fine, but the court must first determine that 
the failure to pay was in fact willful, and that means determining that 
the person had the ability to pay the amount owed.83 To do otherwise 
would amount to “no more than imprisoning a person solely because 
he lacks funds to pay a fine.”84 And that is unconstitutional.85 Instead, 
judges must inquire as to a person’s ability to pay prior to imposing 
incarceration for nonpayment.86 Courts have an affirmative duty to 
conduct these inquiries and should do so sua sponte.87 Further, a 
court’s obligation to conduct indigency inquiries endures throughout 
the life of a case.88 A person may lose his or her job or suddenly 
require expensive medical care, leaving him or her in precarious 
financial circumstances. For that reason, a missed payment cannot 
itself be sufficient to trigger a person’s arrest or detention unless the 
court inquires anew into the reasons for the person’s non-payment 
                                                                                                                 
visited Apr. 9, 2017). 
 78. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-18-112 (repealed 2012). 
 79. See BERKELEY L., UNIV. OF CAL., POL’Y ADVOCACY CLINIC, HIGH PAIN, NO GAIN: HOW 
JUVENILE ADMINISTRATIVE FEES HARM LOW-INCOME FAMILIES IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CALIFORNIA 3 
(2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2738710. 
 80. See id. at 5. 
 81. Id. at 15. 
 82. Id. at 9, 15. 
 83. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672 (1983). 
 84. Id. at 674. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. at 672. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. at 670. 
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and determines that it was willful.89 For those who cannot afford to 
pay, the court must consider alternatives to incarceration.90 These can 
include extending the time for payment, reducing the debt, requiring 
the defendant to attend traffic or public safety classes, participating in 
mental health or substance abuse counseling, attending school, or 
imposing community service.91 
Even in jurisdictions that do not incarcerate people for failure to 
pay court debt, there are other collection practices that exacerbate and 
criminalize poverty.92 The most common is driver’s license 
suspensions.93 In many jurisdictions, courts are authorized, and in 
many instances required, to initiate the suspension of a person’s 
driver’s license to compel the payment of outstanding court debt.94 
Often these suspensions are automatic; there is no hearing in advance 
of the suspension, and often there is no ability to obtain a hearing 
after the suspension occurs.95 In Virginia, 900,000 people—or one in 
six drivers—have had their licenses suspended under these 
circumstances.96 In California, from 2006 to 2013, the California 
Department of Motor Vehicles suspended more than 4.2 million 
driver’s licenses for nonpayment of fines and fees.97 
The consequences of license suspensions can be harsh. People 
depend on their driver’s licenses to get to work, to get themselves or 
their families to the doctor, or their children to school.98 From a 
                                                                                                                 
 89. Bearden, 461 U.S. at 672–73. 
 90. Id. at 672. 
 91. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 42-8-102 (2015). Recognizing this constitutional imperative, some 
jurisdictions have codified alternatives to incarceration in state law. See, e.g., O.C.G.A. § 42-8-
102(f)(4)(A) (providing that for “[f]ailure to report to probation or failure to pay fines, statutory 
surcharges, or probation supervision fees, the court shall consider the use of alternatives to confinement, 
including community service”). 
 92. See ALEX BENDER ET AL., W. CTR. ON L. AND POVERTY, NOT JUST A FERGUSON PROBLEM: 
HOW TRAFFIC COURTS DRIVE INEQUALITY IN CALIFORNIA 6 (2015), https://wclp.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/04/Not-Just-a-Ferguson-Problem-How-Traffic-Courts-Drive-Inequality-in-
California.pdf. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 6, 15. 
 95. Id. at 6, 12. 
 96. See Statement of Interest of the United States at 4, Stinnie v. Holcomb, No. 3:16-CV-00044, 
(W.D.V.A. 2016). 
 97. See BENDER ET AL., supra note 92, at 13, 26 n.40. 
 98. Id. at 6–7. 
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public policy perspective, suspending driver’s licenses makes no 
sense. If the goal is for people to pay their court debt, why would we 
make it more difficult for them to get to work? As a practical matter, 
people whose licenses are suspended often drive anyway—because 
they have to get to work, or to the doctor, or to their children’s 
school.99 If they are stopped by law enforcement, they then get a 
ticket for driving on a suspended license, which in many states is a 
misdemeanor.100 More fines and fees are imposed, and they may be 
incarcerated—all and simply because they are poor.101 
C. Access to Counsel 
The final example of the ways in which the justice system enforces 
poverty concerns the absence of effective legal assistance in the civil 
justice system. Every day, Americans confront life-altering civil legal 
problems like foreclosure, eviction, unemployment, debt, and 
domestic violence, and most low- and moderate-income people do so 
without effective legal assistance.102 There is no federal 
constitutional right to counsel in civil cases, and typically, state laws 
and constitutions only provide counsel in juvenile dependency 
actions when the state is attempting to remove children from their 
parents.103 
Three barriers conspire to limit access to justice for low- and 
middle-income people. They are structural, economic, and 
epistemological. The structural impediment has existed from the 
outset. Our justice system was constructed by and for lawyers.104 It 
rests largely on the premise that everyone has a lawyer, and it works 
reasonably well if that is true.105 In our civil justice system today, 
                                                                                                                 
 99. Id. at 20. 
 100. See id. 
 101. See id. 
 102. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA 1 (2009). 
 103. See Rebecca Buckwalter-Poza, Making Justice Equal, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Dec. 8, 2016, 
9:03 AM), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/criminal-justice/reports/2016/12/08/294479/ 
making-justice-equal/. 
 104. See Jona Goldschmidt, The Pro Se Litigant’s Struggle for Access to Justice, 40 FAM. CT. REV. 
36, 36 (2002). 
 105. See id. 
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however, many people do not have lawyers to represent them, and in 
some areas of the law, many is most.106 Our best estimate is that in at 
least 80% of family law cases—child support, child custody, 
divorce—at least one party is unrepresented.107 Our best estimate is 
that 90% of tenants in eviction cases represent themselves.108 
The reason people represent themselves is because lawyers are 
expensive—the economic barrier to access to justice. In 2013, the 
national average hourly rate for a law firm partner is $536 per hour; 
for an associate, the average was $370 per hour.109 The cost of a 
lawyer is simply out of reach for any one living at or near the poverty 
level. A family of four living in poverty would spend over half of its 
weekly income for an hour of a lawyer’s time.110 An individual 
working at minimum wage could spend an entire week’s wages for 
an hour of a lawyer’s time.111 
That is only one part of the economic equation; the other is the 
lack of resources for the organizations that provide civil legal aid. 
Most civil legal aid in the United States is provided through public-
private partnerships, typically some federal, state, or local dollars are 
provided to non-profit organizations that provide services.112 The 
primary and largest source of federal funding for legal services is the 
Legal Services Corporation (LSC).113 In 2015, the budget for LSC 
was $375 million—less than what the government of the Netherlands 
spends on legal services for a country with roughly 5% of our 
                                                                                                                 
 106. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 102, at 23–25. 
 107. Bonnie Hough, Self-Represented Litigants in Family Law: The Response of California’s Courts, 
1 CAL. L .REV. CIR. 15, 15 (2010). The reason there are only estimates is because most courts do not 
track or otherwise measure the number of self-represented litigants in civil cases. See LEGAL SERVS. 
CORP., supra note 102, at 2. 
 108. LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 102, at 25. 
 109. Debra Cassens Weiss, Average Hourly Billing Rate for Partners Last Year Was $727 in Largest 
Law Firms, A.B.A. J. (July 15, 2013, 6:33 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ 
average_hourly_billing_rate_for_partners_last_year_was_727_in_largest_law_f/. 
 110. See AMANDA NOSS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, HOUSEHOLD INCOME: 2013, at 3 (2014), 
https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2014/acs/acsbr13-02.pdf. 
 111. Sam Glover, We Can Close the Access-to-Justice Gap, but You’re Not Going to Like It, 
LAWYERIST.COM (Nov. 10, 2013), https://lawyerist.com/70936/can-close-access-justice-gap-youre-
going-like/. 
 112. Civil Legal Aid Funding, NAT’L LEGAL AID & DEF. ASS’N., http://www.nlada.org/tools-and-
technical-assistance/civil-resources/civil-legal-aid-funding (last visited Feb. 18, 2017). 
 113. See LEGAL SERVS. CORP., supra note 102, at 5. 
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population.114 Put differently, in 2013, the 124 offices funded by the 
Legal Services Corporation served approximately 1.8 million 
people—four percent of the people living in poverty.115 As a result, 
half of the people who walk in the door of a legal aid office are 
turned away.116 
The third barrier to access to legal services is epistemological. 
Although civil justice problems are widespread and frequently 
experienced,117 Americans “do not think of their justice problems in 
legal terms.”118 Many people fail to connect the problems they are 
experiencing with law or rights.119 Instead, they often understand the 
problem as a social problem, a moral problem, a private problem, or 
simply bad luck.120 An immigrant woman from Somalia may not 
know the law protects her from an abusive husband or that there is 
something called a domestic violence restraining order; a worker 
injured on the job may think the accident was simply bad luck; a man 
whose girlfriend will not allow him to see their children may believe 
the dispute is personal. 
On the ground, the lack of access to civil legal assistance means 
that poor and moderate income people are exploited in ways that 
exacerbate their precarious financial status.121 Imagine a single 
mother working a minimum wage job whose daughter gets sick. 
Mom misses a week of work, and her landlord files to evict her. She 
may not know that the fact that her roof leaks and that she did not 
have heat for half the winter is a defense to nonpayment of rent. 
Because of work or childcare, she may not be able to come to court at 
9:00 in the morning or 1:30 in the afternoon when her hearing is 
                                                                                                                 
 114. OPEN SOC’Y JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LEGAL AID IN: NETHERLANDS 1 (2015); LSC Funding, LEGAL 
SERVS. CORP., http://www.lsc.gov/lsc-funding (last visited Feb. 13, 2017). 
 115. Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 103. 
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 117. Rebecca L. Sandefur, The Impact of Counsel: An Analysis of Empirical Evidence, 9 SEATTLE J. 
SOC. JUST. 51, 56–59 (2010). 
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scheduled. She may not come to court because she thinks that an 
uninhabitable apartment is what she paid for. She may just move, 
likely to an even lower rent and less habitable apartment, and 
ultimately, she may end up homeless. If she comes to court, she 
likely represents herself. As noted, 90% of tenants are self-
represented, but 90% of landlords have lawyers.122 Without legal 
assistance, she likely does not know that she has defenses. The judge 
is not likely to ask her, and she will likely lose the case.123 In his 
seminal and award-winning book, Evicted, Mathew Desmond 
explains what happens next: 
Losing your home and possessions and often your job; 
being stamped with an eviction record and denied 
government housing assistance; relocating to degrading 
housing in poor and dangerous neighborhoods; and 
suffering from increased material hardship, homelessness, 
depression, and illness—this is eviction’s fallout. Eviction 
does not simply drop poor families into a dark valley, a 
trying yet relatively brief detour on life’s journey. It 
fundamentally redirects their way, casting them onto a 
different and more difficult path. Eviction is a cause, not 
just a condition, of poverty.124 
Another pervasive problem low income people often face without 
counsel is debt collection.125 Consumer debt is rarely collected by the 
original lender; delinquent debt is sold to debt collection 
companies—often repeatedly—which then attempt to collect from 
the debtor.126 Ultimately, a complaint may be filed and sent to the last 
known address of the debtor—a form of service one agrees to in 
                                                                                                                 
 122. Buckwalter-Poza, supra note 103. 
 123. D. James Greiner, Cassandra Wolos Pattanayak, & Jonathan Hennessy, The Limits of Unbundled 
Legal Assistance: A Randomized Study in a Massachusetts District Court and Prospects for the Future, 
126 HARV. L. REV. 901, 908–09 (2013). 
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many credit card contracts.127 The defendant likely does not live 
there any longer; there may not be a forwarding address; the statute 
of limitations may have run on the collection action; the company 
collecting the debt may or may not have the documentation needed to 
prove their claim.128 They file the case anyway because they know 
that the default rate for collection cases is well over 50%.129 
Defendants who do get notice often do not know that the claim may 
be time-barred; they do not know that the company cannot prove its 
case; they may assume that if they did not pay an old bill, they are 
liable for whatever interest and fees have been added to their original 
debt.130 If defendants do come to court, they usually represent 
themselves, while the debt collection company is represented by 
counsel.131 Debt collectors typically win.132 Whether by default or 
after a hearing, the debt collector secures an enforceable judgment, 
which in many states allows the company to garnish the defendant’s 
wages or even attach a bank account—often without notice.133 
It may not be self-evident why the lack of access to civil legal 
assistance—and its attendant consequences—is the fault of the court. 
There is no constitutional right to counsel in civil cases that judges 
are failing to uphold; there is no obvious unconstitutional practice 
being perpetrated by the court.134 The problem is that many courts, 
and in particular many judges, do not treat self-represented litigants 
fairly or apply the law rigorously and that allows for economic 
exploitation to occur.135 In a groundbreaking study, University of 
                                                                                                                 
 127. Id. at 13. 
 128. See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, CONSUMER EXPERIENCES WITH DEBT COLLECTION 
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FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0117-time-barred-debts (last visited Apr. 
11, 2017). 
 131. STIFLER & PARRISH, supra note 121, at 20. 
 132. Id. 
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 134. Rebecca L. Sandefur, Elements of Professional Expertise: Understanding Relational and 
Substantive Expertise through Lawyers’ Impact, 80 AM. SOC. REV. 909, 925 (2015). 
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Illinois Professor Rebecca Sandefur examined the difference a lawyer 
makes in a civil case.136 Her conclusion was striking: “[K]nowlege of 
substantive law explains surprisingly little of lawyers’ advantage 
compared to lay people appearing unrepresented. Instead, lawyers’ 
impact is greatest when they assist in navigating relatively simple (to 
lawyers) procedures and where their relational expertise helps courts 
follow their own rules.”137 
If court procedures are difficult for self-represented litigants to 
navigate, an obvious solution is to simplify them—an effort that is, 
with greater or lesser success, ongoing in many jurisdictions. The 
more significant issue is Professor Sandefur’s conclusion that the 
presence of a lawyer in a civil courtroom causes judges to follow the 
rules.138 In other words, due process happens when lawyers are 
present to enforce it. Instead of reviewing a debt collection 
company’s case to assess affirmatively whether the complaint was 
filed within the statute of limitations or whether the company has the 
documents required under state law to prove its case, many judges 
simply sign the default judgment that the company’s lawyer presents. 
Instead of making a finding that notice in an unlawful detainer action 
was legally sufficient or asking defendants affirmatively whether 
there are any habitability issues that may serve as a defense to an 
eviction action, many judges believe the antiquated maxim that the 
court must treat self-represented litigants exactly as it treats 
attorneys.139 In fairness, many judges do not realize that they have 
the authority to scrutinize a default judgment, examine a notice, or 
ask questions of a self-represented litigant. Others have so many 
cases on their docket that the imperative to process rather than 
adjudicate cases is overwhelming. But the result is that in the civil 
justice system, self-represented litigants often lose and often when 
they should not.140 
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D. Reasons for and Efforts to Reform 
These are just a few of the ways in which our justice system is 
perpetuating, exacerbating, and criminalizing poverty. The 
courthouse has become Bleak House. The consequences of our 
justice system not only wreak havoc on people’s lives and destabilize 
communities, they also threaten to undermine our democracy. In a 
recent article published in the Iowa Law Review, Duke Law School 
Professor Sara Sternberg Greene described the findings from research 
she conducted among public housing residents in Massachusetts.141 
People profoundly distrust the justice system. As one of her 
respondents complained, “it’s all law and courts and bad. Stay away 
from the law, that is my MO.”142 Indeed, the most disturbing finding 
of her research is that people’s experiences with the justice system—
what they perceived as a degrading and humiliating process with 
unfair results determined largely by whether you can afford an 
expensive lawyer—have convinced them to avoid the justice system 
even when they have a legal problem, even when they have a good 
defense or a strong claim.143 Poor people’s deep distrust of the justice 
system applies equally to our civil and criminal justice systems. 
Indeed, one conclusion Professor Greene reached was that for most 
people, the civil and criminal justice systems are one and the same.144 
As she observed, “for most poor respondents there is little difference 
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between the two systems. Court is court. The law is the law. Lawyers 
are lawyers. Judges are judges.”145 
That experience of the law makes sense because while I have 
discussed bail, fines, fees, and the lack of access to legal assistance 
separately, in life they do not neatly disaggregate. A woman who 
cannot afford to pay the fines and fees imposed for a parking ticket 
may wind up in jail if she does not pay her court debt.146 If she is in 
jail, she cannot work and cannot pay her rent. She gets evicted. At a 
minimum, she will have her driver’s license suspended, which may, 
in any event, land her in jail if she drives her daughter to school or to 
the hospital in an emergency.147 Poor people caught in the justice 
system are trapped. And once they are in the system, the collateral 
consequences of an eviction, an arrest record, or a criminal 
conviction make it difficult, if not impossible, to get a job, housing, 
an education, public assistance, or access to credit.148 It becomes 
impossible even to get a toehold on the proverbial ladder out of 
poverty. 
Despite the fact that, as former Attorney General Lynch observed, 
“too many of our fellow citizens, especially low-income Americans 
and Americans of color . . . experience the law not as a guarantee of 
equality, but as an obstacle to opportunity,”149 there is hope. Over the 
last few years, Alaska, Kentucky, Maryland, New Mexico, and New 
Jersey all enacted statewide bail reform, either legislatively or 
through changes in court rules.150 New York, California, and 
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Colorado have pending bail reform measures, suggesting strongly 
that we are reaching a tipping point on the issue of bail.151 The 
Justice Department has been actively advocating bail reform in the 
states for many years. The Department convened a National 
Symposium on Pretrial Justice in 2011.152 During their tenures, both 
Attorney Generals Holder and Lynch spoke out about the injustice of 
incarcerating the accused pretrial simply because they are poor.153 As 
noted, the Department has filed briefs explaining why bail practices 
that do not consider a defendant’s ability to pay are 
unconstitutional.154 The Department’s efforts are not unique. 
Advocates have sued state and local jurisdictions challenging their 
bail practices and together with public defenders and organizations 
like the Pretrial Justice Institute, have advocated for reform.155 
Similarly, on the issue of fines and fees, there has been remarkable 
progress since the Department released its Ferguson Report.156 In 
December of 2015, the Department and the White House convened 
judges, court administrators, lawmakers, prosecutors, defense 
attorneys, advocates, and impacted individuals to raise awareness of 
and address solutions to the unlawful assessment and enforcement of 
fines and fees.157 Vanita Gupta, the former head of the Civil Rights 
                                                                                                                 
New Jersey); Nick Wing, Maryland Court Overhauls Bail System That Jails Defendants Just Because 
They’re Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 8, 2017, 4:59 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ 
maryland-bail-reform_us_589b5ee8e4b0c1284f29f29c; Nick Wing, New Mexico Votes to Reform Bail 
System that Jails People Just Because They’re Poor, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2016, 10:52 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/new-mexico-amendment-1_us_5817a3cfe4b0990edc32ed05. 
 151. Press Release, Gov. Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Presents the 12th Proposal of the 
2017 State of the State Agenda: Launching the “New York Promise” Agenda to Advance Social Justice 
and Affirm New York’s Progressive Values (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/ 
governor-cuomo-presents-12th-proposal-2017-state-state-agenda-launching-new-york-promise-agenda 
(New York’s pending bail reform measure); Press Release, Sen. Robert Hertzberg, Hertzberg Unveils 
Legislation to Reform Money Bail (Dec. 5, 2016), http://sd18.senate.ca.gov/news/1252016-hertzberg-
unveils-legislation-reform-money-bail (California’s pending bail reform measure); Wing, supra note 
150 (Colorado’s pending bail reform measure). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Brief for the United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee, supra note 43, at 12. 
 155. See, e.g., The Solution, PRETRIAL JUSTICE INST., http://www.pretrial.org/solutions (last visited 
Feb. 18, 2017). 
 156. Christopher Zoukis, Ferguson, Missouri Under Fire for Revenue-Based Criminal Justice System, 
PRISON LEGAL NEWS (Dec. 8, 2016), https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2016/dec/8/ferguson-
missouri-under-fire-revenue-based-criminal-justice-system/. 
 157. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Fact Sheet on White House and Justice Department 
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Division, and I sent a letter to every state Chief Justice and every 
state court Administrator explaining their legal obligations with 
respect to fines and fees and sharing best practices.158 The 
Department also provided funding to five states willing to pilot 
reform.159 Former Assistant Attorney General Karol Mason and I 
signed an Advisory on the legal and policy framework that should 
govern fines and fees in juvenile courts.160 The Conference of Chief 
Justices and the Conference of State Court Administrators formed a 
National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Reform that is 
developing recommendations and resources for courts.161 In Jackson 
and Biloxi, Mississippi, in Benton County, Washington, in 
Rutherford County, Tennessee, in Jennings, Missouri, in 
Montgomery, Alabama, in New Orleans, and in other jurisdictions 
throughout the country, public interest advocates like the ACLU, 
Civil Rights Corps, Equal Justice Under Law, the Southern Poverty 
Law Center, and the Southern Center for Human Rights, often with 
the assistance of pro bono lawyers, have either settled or won law 
suits challenging debtors’ prisons.162 In Virginia, advocates filed suit 
against the state’s practice of suspending driver’s licenses for unpaid 
court debt without first conducting an ability-to-pay hearing.163 The 
                                                                                                                 
Convening—A Cycle of Incarceration: Prison, Debt and Bail Practices (Dec. 3, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/fact-sheet-white-house-and-justice-department-convening-cycle-
incarceration-prison-debt-and. 
 158. Gupta and Foster Letter, supra note 54, at 1. 
 159. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 157. 
 160. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE FOR ACCESS TO JUSTICE, ADVISORY FOR RECIPIENTS OF 
FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE ON LEVYING FINES AND FEES ON 
JUVENILES (2017), https://ojp.gov/about/ocr/pdfs/AdvisoryJuvFinesFees.pdf. 
 161. Press Release, Nat’l Ctr. for State Courts, Top National State Court Leadership Associations 
Launch National Task Force on Fines, Fees and Bail Practices (Feb. 3, 2016), 
http://www.ncsc.org/Newsroom/News-Releases/2016/Task-Force-on-Fines-Fees-and-Bail-
Practices.aspx. 
 162. Fuentes v. Benton County, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (June 1, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/ 
cases/fuentes-v-benton-county; Shutting Down Debtors’ Prisons, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW, 
http://equaljusticeunderlaw.org/wp/current-cases/ending-debtors-prisons/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2017) 
(describing lawsuits in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Missouri); Michelle Willard, Suit Against 
Rutherford County, PCC Will Continue, DAILY NEWS J. (Mar. 23, 2016, 9:14 AM), 
http://www.dnj.com/story/news/local/2016/03/22/suit-against-county-pcc-continue/82112016/. 
 163. DOJ: Virginia Driver’s License Suspension Law Is Unconstitutional, WHSV (Nov. 14, 2016, 
11:06 AM), http://www.whsv.com/content/news/DOJ-Virginia-drivers-license-suspension-law-is-
unconstitutional-401114276.html. 
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Justice Department filed a statement of interest in the case advancing 
the United States’ position that suspending a driver’s license is 
unconstitutional if it is done without providing due process and 
without assessing whether the individual’s failure to pay was willful 
or the result of an inability to pay.164 Similar suits in California and 
Tennessee were recently filed.165 
Individual judges have also found the courage to stand up to 
prevailing practices and conduct themselves and their courtrooms 
differently. Judge Ed Spillane, a municipal court judge in College 
Station, Texas, wrote an op-ed in the Washington Post entitled “Why 
I Refuse to Send People to Jail for Failure to Pay Fines”;166 Judge 
Marcia Morey, Chief District Court Judge in Durham County, North 
Carolina, explained in the News and Observer what happens “When 
Traffic Court Becomes Debtors Prison.”167 In Arizona, Missouri, 
Ohio, and Texas, the Chief Justices have all championed changes to 
court rules that would mandate ability-to-pay determinations before 
any defendant is incarcerated for failure to pay fines and fees.168 And, 
in January, the Alabama Court of the Judiciary found Judge Lester 
Hayes, Presiding Judge of the Montgomery Municipal Court, guilty 
of seven charges of violating the Canons of Judicial Ethics for 
routinely sending defendants to jail for failure to pay fines and fees 
without first conducting an ability-to-pay determination.169 The court 
                                                                                                                 
 164. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Files Brief to Address Automatic 
Suspensions of Driver’s Licenses for Failure to Pay Court Debt (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/ 
opa/pr/justice-department-files-brief-address-automatic-suspensions-driver-s-licenses-failure-pay. 
 165. Complaint, Thomas & Hixson v. Haslam, No. 3:17-cv-00005 (M.D.Tenn. Jan. 04, 2017); Press 
Release, Am. Civil Liberties Union, Low-Income Drivers Sue California DMV for Illegally Suspending 
Licenses (Oct. 25, 2016), https://www.aclunc.org/news/low-income-drivers-sue-california-dmv-
illegally-suspending-licenses. 
 166. See Spillane, supra note 67. 
 167. See Marcia Morey, When Traffic Court Becomes Debtors’ Prison, NEWS & OBSERVER (Apr. 19, 
2016, 11:44 AM), http://www.newsobserver.com/news/local/community/durham-news/dn-opinion/ 
article72612127.html. 
 168. See, e.g., Money or Justice? How Fees and Fines Have Contributed to Deep Distrust of the 
Courts—and What Chief Judges Are Doing About It, JUDICATURE, Winter 2016, at 43; SUPREME COURT 
OF ARIZ., TASK FORCE ON FAIR JUSTICE FOR ALL, JUSTICE FOR ALL 15–16 (2016), 
http://www.azcourts.gov/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=bmEC0PU-FD8%3D&portalid=74. 
 169. Agreement and Stipulation of the Parties at 1, 2, 4, 13, 14, In re Hayes, No. 49 (Ala. Jud. Ct. 
Nov. 17, 2016). 
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suspended Judge Hayes without pay for 11 months, and taxed him 
with the cost of investigating and adjudicating the proceedings.170 
There has also been progress with respect to the provision of 
effective legal assistance in civil cases. In 2010, the U.S. Department 
of Justice created the Office for Access to Justice (ATJ) whose 
“mission is to help the justice system efficiently deliver outcomes 
that are fair and accessible to all, irrespective of wealth and 
status.”171 Among many other initiatives, ATJ created what is now 
known as the White House Legal Aid Interagency Roundtable.172 
Comprised of twenty-one federal agencies committed to better 
serving low-income people and vulnerable populations by 
encouraging federal agency partnerships with civil legal aid,173 the 
Roundtable has unlocked millions of dollars of federal funds for civil 
legal aid providers. 
Courts, too, have recognized the need to better assist civil litigants. 
The Conference of Chief Justices and the Conference of State Court 
Administrators both adopted a resolution supporting the goal of 
100% access to effective assistance for essential civil legal needs and 
urging their members to work with their state Access to Justice 
Commissions or other entities to develop a strategic plan with 
realistic and measurable outcomes. Toward that end, the Public 
Welfare Foundation recently launched the Justice for All project and 
funded seven states to assess effective access to justice and strategic 
action plans to implement the resolution.174 
Overwhelmed by self-represented litigants, several courts have 
adopted innovative reforms. In New York, the Court Navigator 
Program trains college students, law students, and other volunteers to 
assist unrepresented litigants in housing court and in consumer debt 
                                                                                                                 
 170. Id. 
 171. Office for Access to Justice Home, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, https://www.justice.gov/atj (last 
visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 172. White House Legal Aid Interagency Roundtable, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
https://www.justice.gov/lair (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 173. Id. 
 174. Justice for All Project Grants Announced, PUB. WELFARE FOUND. (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://www.publicwelfare.org/justice-for-all-project-grants-announced/. 
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cases in civil court.175 In California, the Court has created Justice 
Corps, a national service program that has helped over one million 
Californians.176 Three hundred Justice Corps members volunteer to 
serve people coming to court without an attorney, helping them 
resolve crucial legal matters affecting their families, housing, 
personal safety, and financial stability.177 
Much more needs to be done. First, we need to change court 
culture and restore people’s faith in the justice system. That will 
require fundamentally shifting the paradigm under which courts 
operate away from one determined by what is best for the judges and 
lawyers to one that focuses on and serves the litigants who seek 
justice. Judges, too, must change. Rather than viewing their role as 
referees, calling balls and strikes in a game of combatants, judges 
need to embrace the ideal of justice. We need to make jurists like 
Judge Spillane and Judge Moray the norm and Judge Hayes the 
exception. 
Second, we need to persuade legislators in state government that 
courts serve the entire community and should be funded by general 
revenue and not by fines and fees. The justice system itself is 
constrained by poverty. Since the Great Recession, funding for state 
and local courts has declined, leaving Courts overwhelmed with 
cases and without the resources to provide adequate self-help, to 
adopt innovative technologies, or to hold court at night or on 
weekends.178 
Third, we need to continue to litigate against unlawful practices. 
We will never be able to bring lawsuits everywhere they are needed, 
but when a case is brought against one jurisdiction, others take 
notice. We need to develop and advance the argument that there can 
be no price tag on justice. The Supreme Court does not recognize 
                                                                                                                 
 175. Volunteer Opportunities: Court Navigator Program, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., 
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/housing/rap.shtml (last visited Apr. 12, 2017). 
 176. JusticeCorps, CAL. COURTS, http://www.courts.ca.gov/justicecorps.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 
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 177. Id. 
 178. See PETER T. GROSSI, JR., JON L. MILLS, & KONSTANTINA VAGENAS, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE 
COURTS, CRISIS IN THE COURTS: RECONNAISSANCE AND RECOMMENDATIONS 83 (2012). 
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poverty as a suspect classification,179 nor, as noted, has the Court 
been willing to adopt a civil right to counsel.180 The Court does, 
however, recognize that “punishing a person for his poverty” has no 
place in the justice system.181 Indeed, one can craft a compelling 
argument that constitutionally, justice cannot in any way depend on 
money.182 The parameters of this line of reasoning need to be pushed 
throughout the justice system—both civil and criminal. 
In 1886, Frederick Douglass gave a speech commemorating the 
twenty-fourth anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation.183 
Speaking nine years after the Federal Army was withdrawn from the 
South and Reconstruction era reforms had largely been reversed, 
Douglass focused on the justice system and warned that “where 
justice is denied, where poverty is enforced, where ignorance 
prevails, and where any one class is made to feel that society is an 
organized conspiracy to oppress, rob and degrade them, neither 
persons nor property will be safe.”184 Douglass could well have been 
                                                                                                                 
 179. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 2 (1973). 
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Williams, Tate, and Bearden were cases in which a criminal defendant’s liberty interest was directly 
implicated, “Griffin’s principle has not been confined to cases in which imprisonment is at stake.” 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 103 (1996). Rather, the constitutional principle reaffirmed by these cases 
prohibits the imposition of adverse consequences against indigent defendants solely because of their 
financial circumstances, regardless of whether those adverse consequences take the form of 
incarceration, reduced access to court procedures, or some other burden. 
 183. Frederick Douglass, Speech on the Occasion of the Twenty-Fourth Anniversary of Emancipation 
in D.C.: Southern Barbarism (Apr. 16, 1886), reprinted in FREDERICK DOUGLASS: SELECTED SPEECHES 
AND WRITINGS (Phillip S. Foner ed., 1950). 
 184. Id. 
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talking about the justice system today. We have seen lately 
considerable unrest among those denied justice. And while the 
protests have largely been focused on law enforcement, if you scratch 
the surface of people’s discontent, it is the entire justice system that 
they indict. We need to heed Douglass’ warning and ensure that our 
justice system finally and firmly provides equal justice under law. 
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